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ABSTRACT
This essay examines the phenomenological and political dimensions of 
force in north India. Manifest as embodied experience, and as power and 
domination, force encompasses felt emotion and collective clout. Yet unlike 
other categories traversing the political and experiential, force has been 
comparatively understudied. This paper surveys ethnographic and historical 
examples where force is prevalent. We see it in urban life, as an idiom of 
moral states, as embedded in community narratives and social hierarchies, 
and as enacting political demarcations. A focus is on the 1992 nationalist 
destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, when force was invoked and 
expressed. Through this study, certain tensions and paradoxes are raised. 
Force is seen as indispensable to state authority and legal sanction. 
Simultaneously, it is a field of potentials irreducible to human intentions. 
While force is a recurring locus of impetus and influence, it is also volatile 
and delinquent. It gives us insight into moments of concatenation without 
presuming contained interest or enduring stability. Force, affective and 
effective, is also slippery and insurrectionary, illuminating processes of 
mutability and contingency, in India as elsewhere.
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On 6 December 1992,1 thousands of Hindu activists assembled in the Indian city of Ayodhya.2 
Wearing saffron, chanting slogans, riding loud motorcycles, they converged at the Babri Masjid. 
This was a mosque, built in 1528, and inaugurated during Mughal emperor Babur’s reign. 
Nationalists claimed it the most egregious example of iconoclastic destruction by Muslim invaders. 
For them, the mosque usurped an 11th century Hindu temple consecrating Rama (or Ram), 
a central deity. Its carved pillars, it was said, were employed in the mosque’s construction.
This contention over the site began in the 19th century.3 British colonizers partitioned the site: Hindus 
worshipped in an external demarcated area, Muslims inside the mosque. Passions waxed and waned; 
quiet indifference was punctuated by disputes around joint worship and exclusive ownership. In 1949, 
Ram images were installed inside the mosque, catalysing regional riots. The state’s response was 
instructive. The colonial regime instantiated pre-emptory forms – bans, censorship, curfews – that 
counterpoised law’s rationality against public passions. Independent India maintained these imperious 
tendencies: the Babri Masjid was sealed through court and executive orders.
This deferred the dispute into dormancy. Decades later in the 1980s, nationalist organizations – 
organized around the ideology of Hindutva or Hindu hegemony – reawakened it. The Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), longstanding Hindu-first organs, 
led this campaign. They were bolstered by the electoral Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Indian 
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politics. Acrimony hinged on the braiding of religious patrimony, historical narration, and political 
legitimacy. Who rightfully claimed this ground for community and nation?
In the late 1980s, courts debated claims to the site; this dovetailed with nationalist agitation. 
Secular history and colonial archaeology, collective myth and community sentiment were dis-
courses at play.4 A 1986 court decision opening the site catalysed rioting in north India. In 1989, the 
VHP initiated nation-wide processions, inviting donations of consecrated bricks for the future Ram 
temple. These emotive gatherings were accompanied by violence against Muslims. The 
following year, passionate convoys to Ayodhya were stymied by state leaders opposed to the BJP.
What transpired in late 1992 was thus foreseen and yet also unexpected. Militant Hindus 
employed an affective archive built up over time and space, of ritual theatrics, symbolic aggrieve-
ment, and political animus. On December 6th, an unwieldy crowd at the mosque was energized by 
rousing songs and provocative speeches. A crucial catalyst was vociferous goading from an adjacent 
platform of Hindutva notables. Among them was a nationalist preacher, Sadhvi Rithambara. She 
danced, chanting, ‘deliver more force and break the Babri Masjid’ (ek dhakka aur do, Babri Masjid 
tod do) (Jaffrelot 1996: 456).
Hours into this, the agitating throng stormed the site. They scaled the monument and disassembled it. 
With ropes and hammers, rods and pickaxes, they un-built the edifice. A quarter century later, an activist 
or kar sevak recounted: ‘There was no strength in the structure . . . we applied force and took it down’ 
(usme koi dum tha nahin . . . dhakka dete the nikal diya).5 One dome collapsed, then the other two; little 
remained of the mosque by dusk. The undoing of the Babri Masjid precipitated country-wide riots, the 
brunt borne by Muslims. Afterwards, attention was given over to premeditation: was the mosque’s razing 
deliberately engineered or the unintended spillover of mass energies?
Nearly three decades later, in November 2019, the Supreme Court decided the site’s future. Its 
owner was now a government trust vested to build the Ram temple long-desired by nationalists. 
Looking at this trajectory, one is struck by the relationship between brute force and political 
authorization. The aggression of the demolition – embodied and collective – has a relationship to 
institutional sanction. One might say that the illegitimate application of physical energy, in 
Ayodhya in 1992, transmuted decades later into official endorsement. The unbounded exercise of 
somatic force was converted into rationalized legal approval.
This essay examines this embodied politics of force in modern India. I examine the analogy 
between the Hindustani concept of dhakka and the political category of force. We began and will 
end with force’s manifestation in 1992. In between, I draw on ethnography from north India, and 
historical and anthropological literature, to specify the stakes of force.
Ayodhya’s centrality for Indian nationalism opens up the questions which animate my inquiry. 
What is the relationship between the phenomenal experience of force, its socialized distribution, 
and political validation? Why did retrospective commentary on the Babri Masjid’s destruction dwell 
on whether it was planned or inadvertent? How does force come to be seen as intentional 
instrument ascribed to specific agents? Conversely, when is force a distributed phenomenon, 
volatile and disobedient, borne of collective sentiment?
These questions are important to pose in the context of contemporary India. Hindu nationalism’s 
political naturalism is manifest in the dilution and diffusion of responsibility. Specific actors and officials 
enact or enable the violence that afflicts Muslims. Yet the routine evasion of accountability, in collusion 
with the police and judiciary, is effective insofar as violence is conducted by, and on behalf of, general 
categories: the ‘Hindu community’ or ‘the people’ (Hansen 2018, Chatterjee 2020).
This is relevant beyond the inflamed aversion of nationalists for Muslims. Force also underwrites 
how regional players and disenchanted minorities articulate grievances and aspirations. Political life 
in India is less beholden to the normative figures of liberal thought – the deliberative agent, the 
rights-bearing subject, the intentional citizen – than the indeterminate and shifting locus of the 
collective. In this logic, mass energies and communal sentiment are continually provoked and 
invoked (Benei 2008, Ghassem-Fachandi 2012).
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Building on such insights, I propose a prism through which to understand the embodied politics 
prevalent here. Force is one underexplored means by which we can understand how disparate elements – 
crowd passions and electoral mobilization, mob violence and institutional entitlements – converge.
Force is pervasively invoked yet fuzzily defined. For example, observers have long discussed 
notions of power, sovereignty, authority, hegemony, influence, and domination. These ideas are 
adjacent to – but not the same thing as – force. And yet force, despite its conceptual opacity, lurks 
around them. We understand intuitively that force is indispensable to potency and persuasion. It is 
performatively effective and affectively inarguable. Force thus saturates collective action, state 
organization, and social hierarchy. Yet we lack clarity on the thing itself.
This essay analyzes force as an embodied politics. I describe its play in ordinary encounters, 
institutional settings, and political spectacles. My empirical focus is the Hindustani concept of 
dhakka in north India. Dhakka is fairly synonymous with the English term force. Both have visceral 
connotations and are deeply felt. They are experienced from a specific perspective and enacted upon 
others. Dhakka, like force, evokes sensations of pushing, thrusting, jolting, flattening and jarring.
The next section outlines the contribution of force to the literature on emotion and experience, 
and political and public life in India. The proceeding sections unpack dhakka in its myriad aspects. 
We see how it manifests urban encounters in tactile form; how it is a felt experience, and moral 
critique, of hierarchy and institutions; and how it becomes constitutive of collective energies and 
political community.
I depart from research conducted in Old Delhi, where we see force’s ubiquity as an urban affect. 
Then force is historically emplaced; as a longstanding idiom in north India, it animates political 
action, moral horizons, and institutional hierarchies. Finally, we turn to how force was experien-
tially mobilized during the Babri Masjid 1992 demolition and narrated afterwards. The mosque’s 
destruction reverberates decades later. This makes it a useful lens through which to probe how 
extra-legal force relates to political authorization.
Theoretically, an analysis of force shows how events and practices exceed individual intentions. 
Of course, force can be an engineered outcome of certain desires. Yet seeing force as the pre- 
programmed output of agents is conceptually limited and empirically inaccurate. Namely, we 
cannot account for how force may elude and escape willed objectives. Force illuminates how 
authority is directed and influence is validated. But dhakka is more analytically useful for showing 
how an embodied politics engulfs actors in unforeseen ways. Force may both map onto and exceed 
prescribed designs.
Thus I argue that that force is indispensable but delinquently mobile. It is an intensity that is not 
merely contained self-interest. We may understand it as an accumulation of atmosphere and 
influence that exceeds sociological lines. Finally, force shows how bodily experience and emotional 
expressions are fundamental to collectivity and politics. They are not epiphenomenon, or side 
effects, or surface-level expressions of interests and agendas. I suggest, in contrast, that force – at 
certain moments – is those things themselves.
To get to those claims, we must start from lived experience. We unspool our analysis from how 
force exists as an ordinary potentiality and available intensity in India. After the next theoretical 
section lays out the stakes of this study, we turn to this realm.
2. Conceptual Terrain
My purpose in this essay is to stimulate scholars interested in the conjunction of two dimensions. The first 
concerns subjective experience: the realm of the phenomenological, embodied, affective, and emotive. 
The second regards the political and collective: the domain of power and domination as they are manifest 
in social life. Force, I suggest, offers a useful means to stitch together these realms.
Writings on India have probed the embodied and emotive from different angles: from violence 
(Das 2006) to sexuality (Shah 2014) to play (Kumar 1988) to love (Trawick 1992) to education 
(Benei 2008). The writing on politics is also extensive: we have dissections of sovereignty (Hansen 
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and Stepputat 2005), dominance and hegemony (Guha 1997), citizenship (Jayal 2013), the state 
(Fuller and Harriss 2001), and corruption (Gupta 2012).
Where these realms intersect is in writing on masses, crowds, and the popular (Ghassem- 
Fachandi 2012, Cody 2015, Mazzarella 2017, Chakrabarty 2007, Chatterjee 2020). In this literature, 
the upsurge of intensity, the irreducible concentration of affect, makes collective politics possible. 
The emotional registers here include effervescence, anger, and pain. In such works, the analytical 
focus is often on the contingent moment, the isolated episode, whereby a certain collaboration or 
expression is possible. Such studies point to social and political realms beyond established form, 
institutional structure, or official authority. These analyses of crowds and multitudes, masses and 
publics, underline what is emergent and excessive, and yet has lasting imprints.
This essay contributes towards these studies by offering an optic – that of force – that contracts 
and expands across realms. Dhakka bridges deeply felt individual experience as well as public 
sentiment and political mobilization. And it opens up these transverse sites without the presump-
tions of predictable directionality or contained self-interest. To anchor this proposition, I employ 
Simone Weil’s classic study of force in the Iliad (1965). Written during the Nazi takeover of France 
in 1940, it is instructive for our own times.
Weil states that the ‘hero’, ‘subject,’ and ‘center’ of the Iliad is force: ‘force employed by man, 
force that enslaves man, force before which man’s flesh shrinks away . . . the human spirit is shown 
as modified by its relations with force, as swept away, blinded by the very force it imagined it could 
handle, as deformed by the weight of the force it submits to’ (1965: 6). Four aspects of Weil’s 
discussion relate to this essay. First, force is something people apply; it is part of social action. 
Second, force subjects people; to submit is to enter political hierarchy. Third, force transforms what 
is; it alters existing states.6 Finally, force exceeds and distorts certainty; it dissolves intentions and 
undermines will. For our purposes, then, force has elements of activity, submission, metamorpho-
sis, and contingency.
Weil talks of force as ‘that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing’ (ibid., italics in 
original). Force intrinsically has the capacity to instrumentalize and objectify; subject becomes 
object.7 At this primary level, force is a latent potential: ‘it merely hangs, poised and ready, over the 
head of the creature it can kill, at any moment, which is to say at every moment’ (ibid., 7, italics in 
original). At this altitude, force is experienced as ‘orders and abuse’ (ibid., 11) or as humiliation and 
‘the shameful experience of fear’ (ibid., 12). At an amplified level, in its ‘grossest and summary 
form,’ force kills (ibid., 7). Weil writes, ‘exercised to the limit, it turns man into a thing in the most 
literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him.’ (ibid., 6).
Thus for Weil, force is a gradient or spectrum, without and within, that is morally debasing and 
biologically threatening. Those deploying force exercise a tyranny akin to extreme hunger: ‘the power of 
life and death’ (ibid., 11). Supplicants such as slaves, for example, are biologically animate but ‘another 
human species; a compromise between a man and a corpse’ (ibid., 9). They merely ‘imitate nothingness in 
their own persons’, having a ‘life that death congeals before abolishing’ (ibid., 9).
Force is not a stable property. It cannot be lastingly owned, nor mapped along fixed coordinates. Weil 
emphasizes that force ‘is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its victims; 
the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates . . . nobody really possesses it.’ (ibid., 11). Force thus induces 
blindness to fluctuating circumstances. One’s capacity is distorted by the momentariness of enacting, 
rather than receiving, force. This is not an object owned by a subject, nor property held by possessor. It is 
an indiscriminate externality; force engulfs all ‘enmeshed in its machinery’ (ibid., 18).
Anticipating affect as a political catalyst and indeterminate atmosphere, Weil talks of this as an 
inward and outward conversion. We have an oscillation between ‘blind force, which is pure momen-
tum’ and ‘inert matter, which is pure passivity’ (ibid., 22). Force is not a concept or strategy, but a set 
of ‘transmutations’ that disobey species and subject-object distinctions (ibid.). The Iliad’s similes liken 
‘warriors either to fire, flood, wind, wild beasts . . . or else to frightened animals, trees, water, sand, to 
anything in nature that is set into motion by the violence of external forces’ (ibid.). Thus force inheres 
not in the cognitive realm of reason, nor as a deliberate expression of agency. There, it could be 
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sharply demarcated from embodied emotion or collective affect. Rather, force manifests action and 
reaction that mutates and vacillates, like the dynamic co-dependency of wind and water.8
How can we situate Weil’s discussion of force within a wider theorizing of politics? It potentially 
refigures the binaries foundational in psychology, political science, sociology, and anthropology. In the 
intellectual genealogy of the social sciences, the realm of brute power, reactive violence, and animal 
beastliness contrasts with the normalizing – and civilizing – human domains of law, reason, and 
creation.9 The Enlightenment bequeathed a desire to supersede what was internally dangerous (the 
irrational domain of the unconscious) and to emancipate humans from primordial nature (the 
unpredictable and threatening cosmos). Yet we might query whether force executes or undermines 
these divisions.
Hannah Arendt, parsing notions of power, authority, and force, designated the latter as not 
worthy of sustained inquiry (1970). Force, she maintains, should be reserved for the ‘forces of 
nature’ or ‘force of circumstances’, ‘to indicate the energy released by physical or social movements’ 
(Arendt 1970: 44–45). For her, force belongs to the metabolic realm, whereas the political proper is 
defined by creative transcendence and the human-made.
With force’s full dimensions thus sidestepped, it has more generally been discussed as that which 
takes the inscrutably emotive and stabilizes it as rational community. That is how we might read 
Max Weber’s discussion of force in his classic essay, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (1946). Agreeing with 
Trotsky – ‘every state is founded on force’ – Weber emphasizes the kinship between violence and 
modular sovereignty: ‘force is certainly not the normal or only means of the state – nobody says 
that – but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is 
an especially intimate one . . . a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (1946: 78, emphasis in original). Here, 
the problem of force is not its existence but its unboundedness: successful states disarm competitors 
and consolidate their violent capacities.
Weber echoes other thinkers that see force as the fundament of authority. In Walter Benjamin’s 
‘Critique of Violence’, force is simultaneously generative and transgressive; it founds law even as it 
breaks law (1978). Force is at once the extra-legal means of instituting law and its ultimate aim: 
‘lawmaking is power making, and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence’ (1978: 
295). Jacques Derrida also sees law’s inaugural moment, and subsequent truth-claims, as hinging on 
force (1990). For him, the ‘origin of authority’ and the ‘position of the law’ are ultimately based on 
arbitrary, ‘mystical’ bases, a ‘violence without ground’ (1990: 945).
These analyses illuminate the relationship between the extra-legal application of force in 1992 in 
Ayodhya, and the subsequent state authorization of its nationalist capture. Undoubtedly, force, as 
an adamant expression of embodied sentiments, has a generative and intimate relationship to 
institutional sanction. Yet can we say that these analyses of force as the genesis of authority also 
reinforce anthropocentric privilege? In them, force serves to enact human intention and political 
privilege.10 We lose the confounding slipperiness that Weil underscores. Her essay, in fleshing out 
the braiding of felt experience and political aspiration, offers a prism for us to return to India and 
see how force manifests in lived reality.
3. Force’s embodiment, emotion, and experience
In this section, I employ ethnographic material from Old Delhi and secondary literature on north 
India, to ground force as an embodied politics. I suggest that force yokes together the personal and 
political, the emotional and the collective. Yet to understand its public efficacy, it is necessary to 
establish its felt immediacy. The somatic dimension of force, we will see, binds disparate indivi-
duals, while potentially exceeding their aims.
Old Delhi is a dense space par excellence; it has numerous bazaars, shrines, historic sites, and 
temples. Most of these can only be experienced with one’s feet and eyes and nose; it is difficult to 
alienate one’s corporeal self. The area dates to the 17th century, when it was Shahjahanabad, the 
SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 5
Mughal empire’s epicentre. Old Delhi preceded the colonial city’s thoroughfares, and the neoliberal 
ascendance of the automobile. It can be a remarkably still space: a cloister of silence, as experienced 
in madrasas and temples, tea-stalls and rooftops. Yet equally, beeps and laughter, chatter and horns, 
and people – sitting, standing, walking, hawking – define the area. The old city, as a hive of 
commercial activity, is synonymous with bhir (crowdedness).
Of course, crowds are not passive entities but active ones. Such assemblies are aggregates of tinier 
agendas; the crowd is a diffuse character. At the same time, crowds instantiate powerful physical 
effects. They channelize energy and induce reactions. A crowd is force as noun and verb: it hosts 
latent potentials, and simultaneously imprints upon.
A pleasure of conducting fieldwork is to discover local nomenclature.11 I learnt this grammar – 
the ethnographer’s bruised induction to local realities – in my fieldwork commute from South Delhi 
to the old city. One term I encountered for Delhi’s crowd compulsions is dhakka mukki. Dhakka, as 
mentioned, means to push, shove, shock or jolt. Mukka, from which mukki is derived, means to be 
punched or poked. The conjunction of both words linguistically doubles-down. The ‘shove-punch’ 
or ‘shock-poke’ verbally exaggerates what is experientially amplified. In this case, that is sensorial 
magnification itself.
Thus, dhakka mukki denotes the stress of metropolitan navigation.12 In Delhi, this may mean 
anonymous hands and feet tattooing one’s body while entering or exiting a bus. Or being tossed to 
and fro, by sweaty and sticky others, while clambering aboard the Metro. The daily grind of 
commuting, the clotted congestion of bazaars, is ground zero for everyday force. Interestingly, 
force can be individually intentional and collectively diffuse. Let me illustrate with a vignette, from 
late 2007, of an observed exchange. It unfolded while waiting to board a bus near the old city’s Delhi 
gate. I watched a fractious back and forth while an impatient assembly jockeyed for the door’s entry.
In this scene, on the one hand, force is isolated as an outcome of intentions. A middle-aged 
woman said to a boisterous commuter, ‘don’t push me!’ (dhakka mat do!). She sought to pinpoint 
force’s origins. Yet force’s authorship was immediately dissolved and displaced. The seeming 
aggressor, a bespectacled man, responded, ‘what am I to do, the force is coming from behind’ 
(kya kare, piche se dhakke aa rahe hain). The complaint locates force’s genesis: that person 
purposefully acted for a certain outcome. The response reroutes force as originating in nameless 
others. Force in this sense is simultaneously channelled and distributed; it is comprised of multiple 
elements even while manifest as singularity. Force, like density, is among urban affects that impinge 
on the individual while dispersed among many (Rao 2007).
Another aspect of force is worth mentioning: as a sensorial fact, it is subject to schooling. 
Scholars have noted how colonial and postcolonial authorities anxiously eyed urban locales with 
mass crowds (Pandey 1992, Tambiah 1996). Today, invoking dhakka or force, state authorities still 
see crowds as hotbeds of disturbance.
The crowd’s potential unruliness was evident to me in a police announcement heard in Old 
Delhi. The Meena Bazaar lies adjacent to the Jama Masjid. Most days, it has innumerable hawkers 
and vendors, and thus dense pedestrian traffic. The speakers in the bazaar, manned by local police, 
play nationalist anthems and public-service announcements. Distorted from over-amplification, 
squeaky and scratchy, they nevertheless constitute an authoritative soundtrack. One recurring 
admonishment is about the dangers of force: ‘please do not push and shove; please do not push 
and shove’ (dhakka mukki mat kijiye; dhakka mukki mat kijiye). Bumping and shoving: the 
respectable citizen must learn not to indiscriminately employ force.
These ethnographic vignettes illustrate points worth underlining. The first is that dhakka is 
a deeply embodied sense. For example, ‘to eat force’ (dhakka khana) means to suffer a professional 
or personal setback. The figurative dimension acquires palpability for implying ‘ingested misfor-
tune’. Force here is not an abstract entity or distant object, but inside one’s viscera. Similarly, to say 
‘I got such a shock’ (mujhe itna dhakka laga) implies not a second-hand fact but a first-hand 
experience (‘to feel’, laga).
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After dhakka’s manifestation as embodied experience, the second aspect to highlight is its 
transitive character. It is often used in conjunction with an object to which force is applied. Force 
is not merely actionable but is tethered to something and applied to someone. It acts upon, or is 
manifested against. For example, a first-person narrator can describe ‘feeling stunned’ (dhakka 
lagna) by external circumstances. And a third-party observer can watch someone ‘give the boot’ 
(dhakka dena) to another.
Third, dhakka exists in a semantic constellation of analogous terms. It has consonance with 
related affective notions in English – such as force, shock, or pressure – interwoven into Indian 
language sentences. For example, the term force (as an emic, not analytic term) means both physical 
strength and social aptitude. In north India, it is related to drive or cunning in social navigation 
(Jeffrey 2010: 84). The word shock is sometimes employed in similar terms to force. Pressure may be 
used to describe professional and social compulsion. This may include directives enacted by 
hierarchical superiors. Then there are Hindustani terms denoting forcefulness. These include 
zabardasti, meaning to do something involuntarily or coercively. One can hear of hierarchical 
diktats and severe compulsion as zor-zabardasti.
An ethnographic example may illustrate the constellation of shared meanings around force. In the 
Meena Bazaar, I observed the political theatre of urban beautification. This entailed arbitrary police ‘raids’ 
on hawkers and shopkeepers. Low-level officers were generally reluctant to conduct them. As one 
constable told me, they felt forced into raids by professional superiors. Only ‘when pressure comes 
from above’ (jab upar se pressure aate hain) did officers feel duty-bound to conduct these raids.13
Fourth and finally, dhakka – beyond being an embodied experience, transitively unfolded, and 
embedded within a constellation of related terms – is part of a repertoire of moral reflection and 
collective animation. Let us examine two ethnographic examples from north India. They illustrate 
how force figures into ethical terrain and shores up the grounds of community.
In the first, I draw on Christopher Pinney’s vivid ethnography in an industrializing milieu in 
Madhya Pradesh (1999). He elicits reflections on how capitalism, technology, and modernity figure 
into cosmologies of the past and present. Residents there, as elsewhere in modern India, invoke the 
contemporary moment as an immoral ‘era of darkness’ (kaliyug). In one man’s understanding:
“The kaliyug is not a dharmic age. In the dharmyug people were good and honest (imandar). In the kaliyug lots 
of people speak lies, pick pockets (jeb kat dena), deceive (dhoka dena). There is tumult (hallagulla), pushing 
and shoving (dhakka mukki)” (Pinney 1999: 103).
Here, the humdrum friction of pushing and shoving is conflated with ethical assessment. Force is 
not the ordinary churning of society; rather, it is emblematic of treachery and turbulence. Force 
becomes an idiom of moral degeneracy within a cosmology of degraded sociality.
In the second example, from the Punjab, the carnal incorporation of force underwrites collective 
solidarity. In a discussion of emotional landscapes, Radhika Chopra discusses how the state 
suppression of Sikh militancy in the 1980s drew wounds opened again and again. She writes that 
‘Punjabis use the term thes or dhakka to convey a sense of bodily injury’ (2011: 16). Force is not 
merely one person’s experience of physical assault. Rather, it animates collective woundedness. The 
invocation of force signals group hurt, a politics of aggrievement that binds together. Force is 
simultaneously physical immediacy and metaphorical embodiment. Force is first-hand humiliation 
for those who endured counter-insurgency. It is second-hand pain for those who vicariously 
imbibed it thereafter. Dhakka encompasses both violence’s searing sting and the imaginative hurt 
rippling across time and space. Such hurt sentiments have become a leitmotif in Indian politics 
(Hansen 2018). The community must display its scar; pain is the public fundament.
This section has outlined the prevalence of force in north India. Beginning in Delhi, we saw it manifest 
as the somatic intensity of the city, as in the push-and-shove of commuting. It indicates the discomfort of 
unknown bodies impinging on oneself. I suggested that force is generated by individual intentions as well 
as by distributed activity; it is a singularity containing multiplicity. Finally, force is shaped by authorities, 
as in the police admonishment to mass publics not to push and shove.
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Thereafter, I underlined points relevant to scholars of emotion or affect, and politics and publics 
in India. We saw how deeply embodied dhakka as force is: it can be felt and eaten, given and taken. 
The transitive aspect of force was underscored: it is applied to or experienced from. Thus it has 
a subject or object to which it relates, rather than existing abstractly. Force can further be 
semantically viewed in a constellation of related English and Hindustani terms. And finally, the 
experience of force is not singular and contained but relational and unbounded. To be subjected to 
force is to be humiliated or wounded. This hurt is a means by which moral horizons are articulated 
and collective sentiments mobilized. How can we further probe the life of force in India? In the next 
section, I examine the relation of force to Indian social and political hierarchies.
4. Forceful segmentation: the Dhakka of society and politics
My fieldwork in Old Delhi revolved in part around the lifeworlds of male migrants (Gandhi 
2011). These men worked as manual labour and in the old city’s bazaars. They lifted sacks and 
boxes, pushed handcarts, painted and soldered. They circulated between natal villages or towns 
and metropolitan centres. Their lives were precarious in many senses: in terms of their health, 
the duration and quality of income, and their ties in the city. Working short-term gigs, 
dependent on fragile and strained ties for friendship, food, and housing, these men tenuously 
inhabited the city.
For them, authorities were a vexing source of concern. Police constables could shake them down 
for bribes, and arbitrarily and harshly remove them from pavements. Hospitals were also regarded 
with apprehension. Some migrants have chronic health issues such as tuberculosis.
Others have shown this to be a general condition: migrants often feel fear and insecurity when 
dealing with authorities (Ramaswami 2007, Shah 2014). There are existing frames we can use to 
describe such encounters. These include inequality and exploitation. Yet while such terms concep-
tually label a situation, they elide how they are experienced. I suggest that what is embodied, what is 
emotionally activated, in migrants and the urban poor, is force.
Imagine a bureaucrat who demands a bribe, or a doctor who brusquely denies treatment. The 
first is an extractive gesture, the second an expression of indifference. Yet what unites and animates 
them is force. Force underwrites the authority figure’s belief that they can act with relative impunity. 
Behind their credentials and networks is institutional might and symbolic weight. Those subject to 
such force cannot be unaware of this heaviness and imprint. To experience force in its fullness, then, 
is to feel degradation and helplessness.
Let us examine the following anecdote from a Planning Commission of India report on homeless 
urban populations. An impoverished widow of a rickshaw puller describes her husband’s treatment 
at a government hospital.
“ . . . doctor bhi bolta hai, kahta hai, ye koi dharamshala hai jo dawai free main milega. Ghuma deta hai. Nurse 
ne dhakka diya. Admi mar jata hai. Mera admi mar gaya ilaj ke bina.” (“The doctor sounds off, saying this is 
not a charity with free medicine. They spin you around procrastinating. The nurse shoves you aside. People 
die there. My husband died due to improper treatment”) (Mander 2009: 223).
The woman describes the commonplace experience of government hospitals by India’s urban poor. 
She observes the callousness of the doctor’s statement. She describes the confusion and obfuscation 
in getting illness addressed. She claims her husband’s life was lost due to deficient care. And she 
describes the nurse’s lack of compassion as dhakka or force.
The sense of state institutions as places of force is not confined to hospitals. Ward Berenschot 
writes of Ahmedabad residents in their frustrating dealings with officials. As others lacking contacts 
or money know, getting cases registered or licences approved is an ordeal. Their experience of 
bureaucrats is of circuitous navigation and unexpected obstruction. Like the widow described 
above, residents encounter implacable force:
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“there is a Gujarati expression that describes the experience of repeated visits to government offices before 
anything gets done”: dhakka khaavadave chhe (being pushed around’, or, literally, ‘being made to eat’ your 
repeated attempts.” (Berenschot 2014: 201).
In both cases, dhakka is an embodied politics. Force is viscerally felt: in the first instance as shoving 
and the second as pushing and swallowing. The somatics of force manifest a strong demarcation: 
between authorities and subjects.
Arguably, force is a better analytic than commonplace ones of ‘corruption’ or ‘exploitation’. The latter 
terms suggest a clear locus of intentional agency: as if the official behind the desk, or doctor roaming the 
ward, is a transactional beneficiary. Yet remember my anecdote from Old Delhi on pressure’s compul-
sions. Policemen do not merely deploy but are also subject to the force of hierarchy. The gravitational 
imprint of force indiscriminately enacts coercion and compulsion. It therefore dissolves the polemical 
binary of corrupt and non-corrupt or exploiter and exploited. Force becomes a field of entanglement that 
ensnares all, rather than a property or capacity that is possessed.
This does not mean that officials or authorities do not abuse their privilege. Nor do I downplay 
the tangible injustice felt in dealings with the state. What I do suggest is that force engulfs those 
expressing power and those lacking it. It is slippery and unbounded by nature. It implicates 
everyone: those on the dependent side of the transaction, and those who hold more cards.
Furthermore, force is an embodied politics that avoids presentism. The grammar of ‘corruption’, 
for example, has its own genealogy in India (Gupta 2012). It is often understood as a contemporary 
pathology of bureaucratic and political life previously absent. Yet to stay with corruption is to be 
hemmed into a vocabulary that unevenly explains how power unfolds. It is useful that dhakka as 
force is not simply an ordinary affect. Nor is it just a contemporary label for social hierarchy and 
institutional authority.
It has rather been around a long time. Its employment as a way to navigate asymmetry and 
conflict anchors us in an immanent frame. We move into a conceptual space that evades normative 
prescriptions for how states should function and citizenry should behave. We are instead moored to 
the long life of sway and supremacy on the subcontinent.
Let me draw on a piece by Francesca Orsini, on pre-colonial administration in north India, to 
demonstrate (2012). She underlines the use of vernacular expressions in Persian-language admin-
istration. A private letter from 1548 is instructive: ‘written by a courtier of Islam Shah [it] warns the 
addressee against using force (“dhakka nakunand”) against a local Sheikh with good contacts at 
court.’ (Orsini 2012: 233).
My interest in this archival fragment concerns force as a political idiom in north India. Note how 
the courtier’s invocation of force is not about formal authority or institutional power. He suggests 
a field of action and reaction whereby capacities and potentials are distributed. Force is fluid: it 
exists in the addressee’s manoeuvres vis-à-vis another, and is also present in the Sheikh’s relations 
with courtly power.
Both the letter’s addressee and the Sheikh inhabit – rather than possess – the field of force. They 
can be aware of and shape the workings of force, but not own it. Force fluctuates; not containable in 
one-off action, it spurs knock-on effects. That is why Islam Shah’s courtier warns against using 
force. It may not instantiate desired outcomes. Rather, force can catalyse injurious consequences. In 
the next section, I elaborate this idea by reference to force’s display during the 1992 Babri Masjid 
demolition. Beforehand, I offer a final example of how force instantiates hierarchies and makes 
segmentations visible.
In a study of caste politics, Anupama Rao discusses visceral demarcations between relative others:
“My friend’s elderly father, Vasantrao Kamble, had spent his working life in a government office. While 
speaking with him in Aurangabad in March 1997, I casually asked him about caste discrimination. His 
response was illuminating. He said that when caste Hindus at work came to know his caste identity, they 
reacted as if they had received an electric shock. The term Kamble used, shock basane, replaced the more 
common expression, dhakka basane, which means to experience a physical jolt. By describing contact between 
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untouchables and caste Hindus through the metaphor of electric shock, Kamble emphasized his impact on 
upper-caste persons . . . ” (2009: 265, emphasis in original).
In Rao’s description of dhakka and shock, we see the elements of force discussed earlier. For an 
upper-caste person, a lower-caste person in physical proximity induces a ‘physical jolt’ or ‘electric 
shock’. Force is unpleasantly felt, an external impact that is interiorized.
Furthermore, force is experienced in multiply transitive terms. Lower-caste individuals may be 
socialized to anticipate or evade such transgression. This would be a fraught self-consciousness, 
aware of the upper-caste capacity for arbitrary violence and ritualized ostracism. Dalits who know 
they may shock likely truncate themselves to avoid such recrimination. They have been transitively 
moulded by the force of caste privilege. Yet the irony of the anecdote is that it is the purportedly 
high-born who feel acted upon, rather than acting upon others.
In other words, higher castes somatically perceive transgression and react adversely. Lower 
castes witness this recoil, and understand that their social self – as opposed to individual presence – 
has adamant effects. Key to this is the distribution of force. There is shock and retreat, proximity 
and presence, anger and absence. All of this produces caste. The embodied politics of force 
instantiates a certain kind of hierarchy. Arguably, without such forceful feeling, group demarcations 
would not exist in quite the same way.
Yet our study cannot rest with force as synonym for extant sociological lines. In the next section, 
I suggest that what makes force analytically useful in understanding the interface of emotion and 
politics is how it exceeds parameters of community or interest. Force’s indiscipline – its insurgent 
confounding of intentions – sheds light on embodied politics in India today.
5. Force’s inadvertent reverberations
I have suggested that dhakka or force provides an entry point into life in north India. We 
departed by describing force as an ordinary affect – the pushing and shoving of big-city life. It 
is embodied and experienced; felt as jostle and bump. And force is enacted: upon someone 
from without; by a subject to another. Yet force goes further than the city’s empirical grind and 
hectic jockeying. It figures into moral reflections and social and political demarcations. In 
north India, force is an immanent frame for influence and impetus, a way that collective 
entanglements are narrated. Communities bind themselves through its imprint and reckon 
with its stress-impacts.
Force, at one level, manifests existing sociological or political realities. It is found along the 
groove of established segmentary identities. It also conditions how subjects engage with official 
authority – state institutions are places of involuntary inducement. We can well imagine force to 
cement what is already prevalent: it overlaps reliably enough with abiding privileges. As such, force 
seems a synonym for agency: a medium for sedimented interests. At another level, though, force is 
evasive and confounding.
In this section, I suggest we delve into these troubling qualities. That force is restlessly mobile 
and cannot be contained. That it exceeds domestication in how it is concentrated and represented. 
In other words, force expresses intentions yet potentially undoes those same intentions. And to this 
important political and ethical questions – of culpability and accountability – can be posed.
I unpack this train of thought via Ayodhya in 1992 at two levels, and dig deeper than the 
introductory sketch. First, I consider its real-time experiential unfolding. Second, I explore the 
retrospective narration of events. What emerges is force as animating energy and force as uncon-
tainable reverberation. We thereby see how an embodied politics mobilizes and expresses relations, 
and simultaneously allow that force may escape purposes.
As Weil discusses, human intentions are the grounds on which force operates, and what it sweeps 
away. In this sense, force attends to social demarcation and political power. But it does so outside the 
fragile premises of stability or possession. Force allows us to see the contingent expression of mass 
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energies and affect. They work in and through – but are not restricted by – institutions and lineages. 
These usual social science frames take us only so far. To understand ordinary pressures and eventful 
atmospheres, we must attend to how force unfolds across time and space.
To recap, by December 1992, thousands of Hindu activists assembled in Ayodhya. Despite their 
heterogeneity, this large assembly was unified by hurt and anger. Pain around the Ram temple’s 
apparent destruction was twinned with animosity against Muslims. Both structure and community, 
object and subject, became putatively alien: action was necessary to purify the nation.14
In many readings, the mosque’s downfall on December 6th was a singular act of frenzy, an 
intentional act of destruction. Yet it is worth slowing down the tape, as it were. By doing so, we can 
apprehend how it experientially unfolded. Only then can we grasp how force operates: what makes 
it overlap with and exceed intentionality.
On that day, in the morning, a crowd assembled at a platform, next to the police-protected and 
cordoned-off mosque. A steady flow of speeches and songs made the atmosphere festive. By all 
accounts, the space accumulated energy. Elsewhere in Ayodhya, Muslims were attacked and their 
homes set ablaze. By mid-morning, a number of hard-core Hindutva activists swarmed the site’s 
cordon. They pelted the mosque and security forces with stones.
The activists were armed with rudimentary weapons, including pickaxes, shovels, and hammers. 
The security perimeter now breached, they used rope to climb the mosque’s domes. Once atop, their 
iron rods, blow by blow, weakened the structure. Activists below dissolved the structure’s integrity 
with hammers and axes. The security forces fled; journalists were attacked. A crucial part of this 
scene was goading from nationalist notables on an adjacent platform. It was there that Sadhvi 
Rithambara sang out while the assault proceeded, ek dhakka aur do, Babri Masjid tod do (‘deliver 
more force and break the Babri Masjid’) (Jaffrelot 1996: 456).15 The like-minded crowd watching 
this spectacle waved flags and sang victory songs. By mid-afternoon, the left dome collapsed. The 
right and central domes gave way later that day. Once the mosque was destroyed, activists cleaned 
the site and erected a temporary temple. Upon it, they placed images of Ram and nationalist icons.
It is striking that dhakka, as force, is the concatenation of disparate elements that day. This 
exhortation is commentated on in a number of appraisals of the event (Jaffrelot 1996: 456, Guha 
2008: 635, Cush et al. 2008: 74, Nandy 1995: 195). There is even a historicity to force’s invocation by 
nationalists. The somatic solicitation – ‘deliver more force’ (ek dhakka aur do) – informed 
provocations before and since. A version, employed by Hindu rioters in Uttar Pradesh in the 
early 1980s, for example, is ‘give another push and break Pakistan’ (ek dhakka aur do, Pakistan tod 
do) (Engineer 1984: 268).
Let us return to the moment of the mosque’s dissolution. It is as if Ritambara’s refrain is force as 
singularity and multivalence. The strength of her speech act feeds into the directionality of action. 
There is a feedback loop between the raised voice and the bodily activity. The one provides impetus 
for the other. The demand for dhakka does not instigate – as in originate – the physical destruction. 
The meeting of hammers and iron rods on Babri Masjid’s face – aggregations of many singular 
blows – are already unleashed. Rather, the vocal plea bolsters the hammering already evident. Thus 
force does not stem from the speech. Nor does force emanate from the men dismantling the 
structure. Rather, force is a distributed field. It emerges and amplifies through atmospheric speech 
and bodily aggregation and energetic animosity. Force cannot belong to any one party or be 
localized in any single activity. Both the speaker who witnesses, and the person who assaults, are 
entangled in force.
Of note here are the aspects of force outlined earlier. The chant and the activists’ blows are both 
deeply embodied. The one who exhorts force is tethered to the ones who, standing on and around 
the mosque, drill force. Neither the stalwarts ensconced on their platform, nor the activists undoing 
the mosque, are alienated from their senses. The vocal cords chanting are the same body politic as 
the ligaments flexing. Force fuses speech and blow, spectator and doer, cheerleader and actor. The 
dhakka of intensity and impetus animates this collective corporeality.
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Note too how force is transitively enacted. Rithambara’s call for dhakka is a form of interpella-
tion. It exhorts in the literal sense: it urges someone to do something. Force works here by 
compelling an exterior other. It is not an inward-residing affect, but applies pressure to those 
outside oneself. The activists imbibe her chant, and channel it into physical assault. At the same 
time, their bodily exertions on the mosque call upon Ritambara. Their muscular force spurs her 
throaty goading. The transitive workings of force upon a subject slide into the workings of force 
upon an object; and vice versa. Noteworthy here is how nationalist violence is manifest not as a dour 
obligation but as effervescent excess (c.f. Ghassem-Fachandi 2012).
A close look at force shows how the visceral and political converge in India’s public and political 
life. They produce strong affects and effects. In real-time, in December 1992, force stitches together 
disparate bodies into singular collaboration. It is voiced as prodding, and banged out as blows. 
Force sweeps a spectrum of Hindus into singularity. It works antagonistically to homogenously 
conjure an equally diverse Muslim community. Force’s workings symbolically evict them from 
history and eject them from territory.
We also see how force interconnects and disperses; it is an embodied politics that is con-
catenation and distribution. Force, having dissolved the Babri Masjid, radiates outwards. It is 
demonstrative and enabling; the moment that the mosque comes down, other militants take their 
cue. From Ayodhya, it ripples out to Bombay and Delhi, to Bhopal and Surat (Gayer and Jaffrelot 
2012). Force here is localized in the bounded radius of the the Babri Masjid; and it is diffused far 
beyond those precincts, taking life in alleyways and homes thousands of kilometres away. Force is 
in this secondary sense an affective catalyst, ‘triggering’ thousands of deaths and injuries (Basu 
2000: 274).
What happens when we swivel from inhabiting the moment to retrospectively narrating its 
unfolding? Does the neat proximity between force and intentionality, embodied experience and 
engineered outcome, get shaken? Immediately after December 6th, social commentary in India 
dwelt on premeditation. A locus of inquiry was whether the mosque’s demolition had been 
engineered. Another line of thought had it that the swell of affect – the crowds, songs, speeches, flag- 
waving – spun out of control. As Christophe Jaffrelot notes, ‘the recurring question in the aftermath 
of the demolition was: had it been planned in advance?’ (1996: 455). Or as Ramachandra Guha 
writes: ‘Was the demolition of the Babri Masjid planned beforehand? Or was it simply the result of 
a spontaneous display of popular emotion and anger?’ (2008: 635). Thus the question of intention-
ality was central for arbitrating politics in Ayodhya’s aftermath.
The response of various players is revealing. A white paper by the BJP argued against premeditation: 
‘The demolition of the disputed structure was an uncontrolled and, in fact, uncontrollable upsurge of 
spontaneous nature’ (Jaffrelot 1996: 455). Leaders like L.K. Advani said that the events ‘impaired the 
reputation of the BJP and RSS as organisations capable of enforcing discipline’ (ibid., 456).
How do we understand force’s reverberations from a contemporary vantage point? Since 1992, Hindu 
nationalism has become ubiquitous and normalized. With the BJP’s elections in 2014 and 2019, 
vilification and violence against Muslims is commonplace. And 1992’s actors have not been undermined 
by force or chastened for their hubris. Ayodhya’s adherents evaded prosecution and comeuppance. Yet 
perhaps nationalism framed around force is saddled with self-defeating volatility.
Might the exhortation to push and shove Muslims lead only to collective self-injury? Can we say that 
force animated by retribution leads to eternal retaliation and even mutual destruction? Force ostensibly 
consolidates power and clarifies supremacy. Yet, as Weil suggests, it blinds and deforms, ultimately 
exceeding one’s grasp. Remember how the Babri Masjid’s demolition catalysed riots and bombings 
throughout India. From Ayodhya, force cascaded outwards, impelling bombings and burnings in other 
cities. The force that briefly unified the Hindu body politic ricocheted and tore asunder many – including 
Hindu – bodies. Force’s ripples do not discriminate; they potentially sink everyone in their wake.
My aim here is intellectual exploration and not political reckoning or moral accounting. We 
cannot litigate or exonerate; we must raise the question of culpability but bracket it aside.16 It is 
striking to review the government report on 1992 (Liberhan 2009). It emphasizes how embodied 
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experience – leaders’ speeches and activist slogans and crowd excitement – provided an impetus for 
demolition. Yet force remains slippery and confounding. The report only confirms that historically 
patterned and politically organized energies resulted in destruction. Force eludes both real-time 
intentions and post-facto judgement. Wily and restless, force defies design and attribution.
Thus far, this essay has looked at force in terms of its dominant iteration: as an expression of 
violence that underpins power. One can therefore ask: is force so resounding, so emphatically 
successful, or can we recover other lineages of force that inform alternative imaginings of ethical life 
and political cohabitation?
In line with how this essay has proceeded, we might pursue this in the wider conceptual 
literature, and also look for resonances in Indian thought and practice. Weil’s essay highlights the 
ways in which Greek tragedy contains a kind of moral mathematics. For Weil, the Iliad’s perpetual 
oscillation of fortunes, its tacking back and forth of supremacy and degradation, ‘has a geometrical 
rigor, which operates automatically to penalize the abuse of force’ (1965: 14). Retribution is 
seductive and seems definitive; but its outcomes are fleeting and inevitably entail blowback. Weil 
suggests that the Greeks, like those ‘Oriental’ countries where Buddhism is prevalent, understand 
this ‘continual game of seesaw’ as akin to karma (ibid., 15). Vengeance, in Weil’s understanding, 
underpins the interminable play of action and reaction, of violation and retaliation. And we have 
seen how the mindset of Hindu nationalism recuperates pride by vanquishing foes.
But there are other paths possible, different gestures that can be made. For example, Judith Butler, in 
a reflection on Walter Benjamin’s thought, discusses his ideas around forgiveness. For Benjamin, 
misdeeds are ‘countered not in the world of law, where retribution rules, but only in the moral universe, 
where forgiveness comes out to meet it. In order to struggle against retribution, forgiveness finds its 
powerful ally in time. For time . . . is not the lonely calm of fear but the tempestuous storm of forgiveness’ 
(Benjamin 1996: 287 in Butler 2006: 721). Butler notes: ‘forgiveness, which we might ordinarily under-
stand as a capacity achieved upon reflection when passions have quieted down, is here figured as a storm, 
a storm with a hand and voice, and so a divine force, but not one that is based on retribution. Importantly, 
this storm of forgiveness constitutes a radical alternative to the closed economy of atonement and 
retribution’ (Butler 2006: 721, emphasis in original). In other words, forgiveness, in its storm-like quality, 
is available as a counter-force.17
How might we think about such counter-lineaments of force in India? Shankar Ramaswami notes in 
the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi ‘the existence of other forces in the world besides brute force, of soul-force 
and truth-force (satyagraha), exhibited in non-violent activities which non-cooperate with perceived 
wrong or injustice’ (2012: 69).18 In Gandhi’s thought, the immanence of truth or being (satya) is 
conjoined to agraha which can be translated as ‘force, firmness, insistence, or even seizing’ (Skaria 
2016: ix.) ‘But agraha is not just any force – it carries the connotation of overpowering force. Agraha is 
thus the force that occurs as a seizing, a taking hold, or a firmness’ (ibid., 2).
In Hind Swaraj, Gandhi outlines such different aspects of force. What we have mostly discussed in this 
essay is brute force, or what Gandhi variously glossed as ‘body-force’ (sharirbal), ‘gun-force’ (topbal), and 
‘force of arms’ (hatyarbal) (1997: 79). Yet these are not the only forces that humans can exercise: there is 
‘soul-force’ (atmabal), ‘love-force’ (prembal), ‘truth-force’ (satyabal), ‘compassion-force’ (dayabal), 
‘suffering-force’ (tapbal), and ‘justice-force’ (nitibal) (ibid., lvi). For Gandhi, despite that apparent efficacy 
of brute force, ‘the force of love and pity is infinitely greater than the force of arms’ (1997: 84). Here we see 
a resonance with Walter Benjamin’s discussion of forces beyond anger and retribution. Benjamin’s 
‘storm’ of forgiveness meets Gandhi’s ‘force’ of love and truth.
6. Conclusion
Recent years have seen South Asianists take up the idea of emotion and affect (Mazzarella 2017). 
Vitalities, energies, and sensations constitute an expanding terrain for historical and social science 
analysis. Buildings on these studies, this essay has focused on what I term the embodied politics of 
force. I departed from some ethnographic vignettes from Delhi, and broadened the analysis to 
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incorporate historical and comparative examples from north India. I traced out how force is 
found in the stickiness and unpleasantness of pushing and shoving in the city. Force as an 
ordinary aspect of the urban hustle is viscerally felt and transitively enacted. I further suggested 
that force is an aspect of collective reflection, whether on moral horizons, or group persecution, 
or the immediacy of how one caste encounters another. I finally used the 1992 example of the 
Babri Masjid demolition, to show how force maps onto social community and political agendas, 
but also eludes them.
In doing so, my interest has being to engage with scholars in two respects. First, I echoed others 
who find the conceptual language for social action to be limited. Instead of humans as predictable 
agents of social conditioning, I have suggested that force escapes the bounds of intentionality. What 
makes force a recurring locus of impetus and influence also makes it volatile and delinquent. It can 
sweep up disparate people into common cause. But force also turns against those who wield it.
This latter point leads to my second main argument. Dhakka as force is not just about 
phenomenology but about politics. It gives us a way of thinking of moments of concatenation, 
whether commuting in the city, or rallying around around a historical cause. These moments 
cannot necessarily be seen as ones where power is clearly defined, where sovereignty or authority is 
a contained expression of underlying interests or agendas. Rather, force is too slippery and too 
insurrectionary to abide by settled scholarly terms. And in this sense, force opens a window into the 
political’s vexing mobility and contingency, in India as elsewhere.
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that hovers at the borderline of the intentional and the uncontrollable.
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Savarkar asked, ‘Why has the digestive power of the Hindu become so feeble? Now we must develop the power 
of digestion . . . so powerful and inflamed an appetite that is capable of digesting the whole world’ (Sharma 
2009: 165). In this vision, force works not by expelling the troublesome other, but by thoroughly assimilating 
them into the body politic; in both instances, force is an uncompromising somatic energy that subdues threats.
15. A striking aspect of this exhortation is its gendered aspects: a woman prods a predominantly male assembly to 
recuperate their masculinity. Rithambara, along with another prominent Hindutva activist, Uma Bharati, 
recorded cassettes during the early 1990s. These recordings jeer Hindu men for their lack; provocation invites 
exaggerated rebuttals. In one cassette, they exhort: ‘Discard the cloak of cowardice and effeminacy and learn to 
sing the song of bravery and heroism . . . They took your virility, purity, and your greatness to be cowardice 
and effeminacy.’ (Basu 2000: 276–277).
16. Here it is worth noting how much of the discourse on affect, in its embrace of the sensorial and vitalistic, and 
focus on the pre-conscious and pre-symbolic, evades the question of responsibility. I have hesitated to utilize 
affect theory because, in its focus on the evanescent and fragmentary, I do not see grounds for a meaningful 
discussion on justice and accountability.
17. See by way of parallel Skaria’s dissection of Gandhi’s conception of forgiveness and its relationship to 
sovereignty (2016: 259–286).
18. Constraints of space disallow a deeper conceptualization of force in India. See Kumar for a comparative 
treatment of force that counterpoises Gandhi to the writings of Dalit intellectual and drafter of India’s 
constitution B.R. Ambedkar (2015: 59–162).
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